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The spread of foreign currency based loans in Hungary 
In the years between 2000 and 2008 the banking sector grew impressively in Hungary, 
aided by the government’s generous housing loan interest rate subsidy scheme and the 
accommodative stance of regulators towards the dynamic spread of increasingly risky 
foreign currency based loans (hereafter: FX loans). In 2009 the depreciation of the 
domestic currency caused banks’ credit portfolios to deteriorate at an alarming pace, 
prompting regulators to put an end to foreign currency lending and reverse the trend of 
dynamic but risky profit growth. Since the crisis, both retail and corporate loan volumes 
have been on the decline, led by the sharp drop in foreign exchange based financing, 
while bank profits suffered as a result of several government measures aimed to 
improve the financial position of household borrowers. 
A study published by experts of National Bank of Poland in 2007 analyzed the 
monetary policy’s effect on foreign currency based loans in Central Europe. Estimates 
based on a panel of quarterly data for the period 1997–2007 show that indeed domestic 
and foreign currency loans are close substitutes in the analysed countries: the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary. Although, as expected, a rise in domestic interest rates 
affects , domestic currency lending negatively, it concurrently encourages credit 
expansion in foreign currency. Hence, consumers, facing higher borrowing costs in 
domestic currency simply turn to foreign credit. Simulations show that newly created 
foreign currency loans substitute a non-negligible part of the value of lost domestic 
currency loans after a monetary policy tightening. Nevertheless, there are substantial 
differences between the countries, as the ratio of newly created foreign to lost domestic 
currency loans amounts to 5–6% in the Czech Republic, 15–19% in Poland and 31–
39% in Hungary in 2007.1 
The stock of housing loans up to the year of 2011 can be seen on Figure 1, verifying 
the upper mentioned study’s promise of the rising of foreign currency loans even after 
2007. The number of these contracts reached its highest point in 2010, meaning about 
2.7 million.   
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1 Brzoza-Brzezina, Michal – Tomasz Chmielewski – Joanna Niedzwiedzinska (2007) Substitution 
between domestic and foreign currency loans in Central Europe. Do central banks matter? MPRA 
Paper No. 6879. Online available: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6879/  
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Figure 1. Stock of housing loans in Hungary. Source: Szikszai et al 2012.2 
 
 
 
In an empirical study published in November 2009 by authors Pellényi and Bilek we 
can see that – Hungarian FX borrowers are not more financially literate, wealthy or 
risk-loving than their peers. Instead of borrower heterogeneity different forces may be 
at work: persistent interest rate differentials between local currency and FX loans, and 
the underestimation of currency risk due to backward-looking expectations.3 
The attractiveness of FX loans may be attributed to two macroeconomic factors. 
First, interest rates on FX loans were considerably lower, even though disinflation 
lowered domestic interest rates. This gap was basically the consequence of a global 
liquidity glut on the one hand, and the significant Hungarian risk premium due to loose 
fiscal policy on the other hand. Second, the exchange rate was fairly stable against the 
euro (with some swings around the 250 value) and was gradually strengthening against 
the Swiss franc. This strengthening was due to the Swiss franc being a vehicle currency 
of carry trade and the forint being a main target for carry trade investors. In addition, 
economic theory predicts that long term real convergence results in real appreciation. 
Finally, Central and Eastern European currencies tended to overshoot in their 
depreciation following transition. The return to equilibrium levels coincided with the 
onset of financial deepening, creating a favorable environment for FX borrowing.4 
 
2 Szikszai, Szabolcs et al (2012): Financialization, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development – 
Studies in Financial Systems No. 8. Hungary. ISSN: 2052-8027. Online available:  
   fessud.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Hungary-studies1.pdf   
3 Pellényi, Gábor – Bliek Péter (2013) Foreign Currency Borrowing: The Case of Hungary.  In: 
Financial Systems, Efficiency and Stimulation of Sustainable Growth Working Paper 
FINESS.D.5.4. p. 14. 
4 Pellényi, Gábor – Bliek Péter (2013) Foreign Currency Borrowing: The Case of Hungary.  In: 
Financial Systems, Efficiency and Stimulation of Sustainable Growth Working Paper 
FINESS.D.5.4. p. 6. 
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In the economic literature there is no common opinion on the real driving factor of 
the spread of FX loans. While Király et al.5 points out that in the case of Hungary the 
combination of foreign-bank ownership and intense inter-bank competition was a key 
determinant of FX lending, results from a 20 country database analysis contradict the 
view that foreign-owned banks have been driving FX lending to unsuspecting retail 
clients throughout Eastern Europe as a result of easier access to cross-border wholesale 
funding. The cross-sectional results suggest that while foreign banks do lend more in 
FX to corporate clients, they do not do so to retail clients, and while foreign acquisition 
of a bank does lead to faster growth in FX lending to households, this is driven by 
faster growth in household lending per se, and not be a redirecting of household credit 
from domestic to foreign currency.6 
In the Hungarian FX mortgage loan market the typical type of contract was the 
foreign exchange-based loan, which means that the obligation is recorded in FX, the 
installment is defined in FX but the loan is granted in HUF and the installment also has 
to be paid in HUF, depending on the exchange rate on the day it should be performed, 
and it was calculated on FX sell prize of the financial institution. 
The effect of the crisis on exchange rates and installment 
The financial crisis, however, fundamentally changed the situation in Hungary. As it can 
be seen in Figure 2., the exchange rates of both the EURO and Swiss Franc, which had 
been the most common basis of FX mortgage loans have sharply emerged, which 
meant a dramatic change in installments. As the concrete amount of monthly 
installments depends on the exchange rate, most households were facing the fact that 
installment aroused sharply, in many cases they even doubled in comparison with the 
time the contract was signed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Király, Júlia – Judit Antal – Márton Nagy – Viktor Szabó (2009): Retail credit expansion and 
external finance in Hungary: lessons from the recent past (1998–2007)’, BIS Papers No. 4, Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel. 
6 Brown, Martin – Ralph De Haas (2012): Foreign Banks in Emerging Europe. Economic Policy, 
2012/1. p. 85. 
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Figure 2. HUF/EUR, HUF/USD and HUF/CHF exchange rates compared to 2 
January 2006. Source: Reuter 
 
 
Not surprisingly, this caused an emergence of non-performing loans in the financial 
sector. 
 
Figure 3. Share of non-performing household loans of the banking sector. Source: MNB 
(National Bank of Hungary), Note: Before 2010 by costumers, thereafter by contracts.  
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Governmental actions on restructuring foreign exchange based loans in the 
household sector 
Final pay-off on preferential rates 
The first tool to support household borrowers was the chance to pay-off the complete 
debt on fixed and – according to the spot rates – preferential exchange rates. By passing 
Act CXXI of 2011 on 26th September 2011, the Parliament enabled foreign exchange 
and foreign exchange based mortgage debtors to repay the full amount of their debt at 
a preferential, fixed exchange rate (180 HUF/CHF, 250 HUF/EUR and 2 HUF/JPY). 
Final repayment requests for those fulfilled the criteria could have been submitted 
between 30 September and 30 December 2011, and the full amount should have been 
repaid within 60 days after requesting submission, however, the availability of funding 
had to be proved by 31 January 2012. The closing of final repayment and final 
settlements took place until the end of February 2012.  
As another step, amended on 28th June 2011, was Act LXXV of 2011 on fixing the 
exchange rate of FX loans and on the order of forced foreclosure of properties, 
financial institutions had to convert FX-mortgage loans past due for more than 90 days 
on 30 September 2011 into loans denominated in HUF at the average of the mid rates 
published by the MNB of the respective currencies provided that the value of the 
property did not exceed HUF 20 million at the moment of the conclusion of the 
contract. After the conversion creditors cancelled 25% of the debt. The conversion 
period closed on 31st August 2012.7 
According to the official communication of Supervisory Authority of Financial 
Institutions (formal supervisory authority, now the MNB is responsible for 
supervision), 169.256 FX loan contracts have been paid off in the value of 1354,4 
billion HUF, which meant a  23,3% decline in FX-based loans. The direct loss of the 
banking sector was 370,2 billion HUF, coming from the loss on the preferential 
exchange rates, but 30% of this loss could have been comprised in the tax.8 
As from the financial institutions' point of view, besides the exchange rate losses, 
the upper program adversely impacted the quality of banks’ loan portfolios, as it was 
mostly their wealthiest, most creditworthy clients who were able to repay the total debt. 
As a result, banks lost a great share of their lowest-risk clients, while retaining those 
who were barely able or unable to meet their monthly instalment obligations. From the 
point of view of the Hungarian National Bank (MNB), the program posed a significant 
threat to exchange rate stability. By nominally fixing the preferential conversion rates, 
the parliamentary ratification of the scheme, in a single legal act, changed the 
denomination of a significant portion of the banking system’s assets from foreign 
currencies to the Hungarian forint, while leaving the denomination of the liabilities 
intact. As a result, the foreign currency position of credit institutions opened up well 
before the actual launch of the early repayment scheme, creating unintentional 
 
7 OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary. OECD 2012. p. 64. 
8 Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (2012): Gyorselemzés a végtörlesztésről. Online available: 
http://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/gyorselemzes-vegtorlesztes-120312j.pdf (08.09.2015) 
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exchange rate exposure for them. Banks thus needed to buy foreign currency – and sell 
forint – to eliminate their exposure.9 
Home Protection Action Plan 
The Home Protection Action Plan (HPAP) was announced by the Government on 30th 
May 2011, the Country Protection Action Plan was introduced in September 2011, 
allowing early repayment of FX loans at favorable exchange rates. Finally, in December 
2011, the Government and the Banking Association agreed to introduce several 
changes to the earlier measures that ensured a fair burden sharing between banks and 
the state budget. 
The Home Protection Action Plan introduced the elimination of the foreclosure and 
the eviction moratorium. The foreclosure moratorium was abolished for real estate 
properties valued above HUF 30 million (approximately EUR 100 000) and with an 
outstanding credit volume of more than HUF 20 million (approximately EUR 60 000) 
on 1st July 2011. In the case of loans and real estate properties of lower values, the 
moratorium was abolished on 1st October 2011. For these lower value real estate 
properties a foreclosure quota will be introduced amounting quarterly to 2% in 2011, 
3% in 2012, 4% in 2013 and 5% in 2014, of the loans with instalments more than 90 
days overdue. The abolition of the eviction moratorium took place as of 1st July 2011, 
nevertheless, it has had limited impact since then. First, because of low market activity 
in the property markets; second, for social reasons as another seasonal moratorium has 
been implemented according to which eviction in the winter months is prohibited.10 
The main point of the Plan involves a temporary fixed exchange rate (around 20% 
below the HUF/CHF rate at the time of the announcement) applicable to the 
instalments of performing mortgage loan debtors. Only borrowers with no 90 days 
overdue instalments have the right to participate. The difference between the fixed 
exchange rate payment and the actual exchange rate is accumulated on the separate 
forint account bearing the three month BUBOR (Budapest Interbank Offered Rate) 
interest rate and banks are not allowed to charge any additional fees. After the 
expiration of the fixed exchange rate period at the end of 2014, borrowers had to repay 
the difference, meaning an increase in monthly instalments. The government provided 
a guarantee on 100% of the outstanding volume of the bridge loans during the fixation 
period until 31st December 2014, and 25% of the volume afterí the fixation period is 
over. For the guarantee banks pay a fee of 1.5% during the fixation period. The HPAP 
contains an extension of the exchange rate fixing program, available for duly 
performing FX mortgage debtors and those who are delinquent with a delay of less 
than 90 days. 
Accordingly, exchange rates of instalments for participants in the program would be 
fixed until the end of end 2016 at HUF/CHF 180, HUF/EUR 250 and HUF/JPY 2.5 
exchange rates; borrowers could apply for participation in the program until the end of 
end 2012. The difference between fixed and actual rates are shared by the borrower, the 
 
9 Balogh, Csaba – Áron Gereben – Ferenc Karvalits – György Pulai (2013): Foreign currency tenders 
in Hungary: a tailor-made instrument for a unique challenge. BIS Papers No.73. Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel. p. 159. 
10 OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary. OECD, 2012. p. 64.  
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state and the bank in a way that the principal part of the monthly instalment due 
burdens the borrower, whereas the interest rate portion of the instalment is paid by the 
state and the bank in a 50-50% proportion. 
The Hungarian National Asset Management Inc. (HNAM) played and still plays a 
leading role in the HPAP system. The work of the Hungarian National Asset 
Management Inc., as a primary asset manager, allows a uniform framework for records 
on assets to be developed and also a professional, economic-efficiency-focused 
property management to be performed. 
As the element of the HPAP, the National Asset Management company buys the 
houses of the borrowers, in which they can further stay as tenants, and the bank 
releases the loan of the borrower. There are strict rules for joining the program both 
for the property and for the borrower.  
As for the property to be bought by the state:  
 the value of the real estate may not reach 20 million HUF (about 60 000 EUR) 
by the time of the loan contract 
 the amount of the loan had to be 25-80% of the market prize of the property 
 the loan contract had to be made before 30th December 2009, and on 1st 
January 2013 the loan had to be non-performing for more than 180 days 
 the property is registered as “house”, “flat” or “farmstead” 
 the cover of the FX loan is the solely the property to be bought 
As for the borrower:  
 he/she is indigent (social requirements, like nursing a family member, or being 
retired or having at least one children) and  
 has only one immoveable estate, the object of the mortgage. 
According to the data of the company published in August 2014, since its working 
period until August 2014, the HNAM has bought more than 22.000 real estates from 
indigent borrowers securing the living for more than 102.000 people effected by the 
financial crisis.  
Restrictions on financial contracting 
Act CXII of 1996 on the functioning of financial institutions, being in force at the time 
of the credit boom and still applicable at the beginning of the global financial crisis in 
2008, specified in Article 210 (3)that interest rates, charges and other contract 
conditions may be unilaterally amended under the “conditions and circumstances 
established by the financial institutions” if the contract makes this explicitly possible in 
a separate clause. This provision was in effect until 8th August 2009. The situation only 
partially changed in 2009 with the adoption of the Code of Conduct that contains an 
exhaustive list of situations where credit institutions may unilaterally change repayment 
conditions. This is a soft law instrument (although, in case of noncompliance by the 
signatory banks the HFSA can impose sanctions) and only applies to agreements 
concluded after its entry into force. The Code of Conduct mentions three main groups 
of events and circumstances which justify unilateral amendment of the loan agreement 
by the creditor: a) changes in laws and regulations directly affecting contracts on 
financial services and those on the activity of the financial institutions; b) changes in the 
financial market, and c) changes in macro-economic environment and customers' risk 
rating. 
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The new rules introduced by Act LXXXVI of 2009 (in force as of January 1st, 2010) 
narrowed the far-reaching liberalism which existed before by limiting the possibility of 
unilateral amendment of loan agreements and financial leasing agreements to the 
interest rate, charges and costs. Amendment of other contract conditions, including the 
conditions on unilateral contract amendment is no longer allowed to the detriment of 
the debtor. However,  creditors can only exercise their right to unilaterally amend the 
contract when the contract explicitly contains the objective circumstances of such 
amendment and subject that the creditor had previously established his pricing policy in 
written. However, the law does not detail what is meant by written form. Conditions of 
unilateral amendment of the interest rate were further detailed by Government 
Ordinance No. 275/2010. According to this, unfavourable changes in costs of the 
creditor connected to its financing sources may also justify unilateral amendment of the 
contract. Increase in the costs of the financing sources may mean an increase in the 
base interest rate of the National Bank of Hungary, in the inter-bank money market 
interest rates' loan rate, shift of the yield curve of the bonds issued by the Hungarian 
State or the creditor and the swap yield curve relative to each other and the provable 
increase of the costs of loan agreements concluded by the financial institution for re-
financing the loan agreement.11 
In early July 2014, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new law on FX mortgage 
agreements (Act XXXVIII of 2014). The antecedent of this Act was Supreme Court 
decision 2/2014, Civil Law Decisions, which is examined later in this study. This law, 
among other things, enacted a statutory presumption that all provisions entitling banks 
to unilaterally modify costs in consumer mortgage agreements are unfair. This statutory 
presumption was extended to all general terms and conditions (GTC) used by banks 
between 2004 and 2014. Banks were given the option, if they wanted to protect the 
validity of their current or previous general terms and conditions, to file a legal action 
against the state. In this newly established court procedure banks bear the burden of 
proof that their GTC provisions are not unfair. Approximately 60 financial institutions 
filed such legal actions against the state. Ordinary courts are currently delivering the 
final judgements and banks are losing in these procedures. 
A final step in leading out FX mortgages is the so called “forinting” of these 
agreements – an option to change the currency of debt according to Act LXXVII of 
2014. The main object of the regulation is to turn back household borrowers to HUF 
currency based loans, and with applying the preferential rates guaranteed by the Act, 
stop the growth of FX denominated loans. The next Table summarizes the regulated 
fields of the Act LXXVII of 2014. 
 
Table 1: Main points of Act LXXVII of 2014 – leading out household FX loans 
  
Scope Consumer loan agreements made after 1st May 2004 and still in 
effect on 1st February 2015, including loan or lease contracts.  
Not in scope: credit card contracts, loans connected to bank 
accounts and state-supported house-loans 
 
11 Domurath, Irina – Comparato, Guido – Micklitz, Hans‐W. (eds) (2014) The Over-Indebtedness of 
European Consumers – A View from Six Countries. EUI working paper law 2014/10. p. 169-170. 
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Enforcement After 1st February, banks should modify their contracts according 
to the Act, and after 1st January 2015, FX-based installments should 
be calculated and payed on the official exchange rate of the 
Hungarian National Bank on 7th November 2014  
Preferential 
exchange rates 
256,5 HUF/CHF, 309 HUF/EUR and 2,16 HUF/JPY (MNB 
official exchange rates on 7th November, 2014) 
Modifying the 
financial 
contract 
3.§ (1) “The consumer loan contracts are modifying according to 
this Act” (2) “The financial institute should prepare the modified 
consumer loan contract and the connected security contract” 
Turning the 
contract into 
HUF-based 
loans 
According to 15 §, financial institutes shall exchange the amount of 
FX-based debt to HUF-based debt on 1st February 2015 on the 
upper mentioned exchange rates and shall inform borrowers on the 
fact of changing as well as on the amount concretely saved by the 
regulation of the Act and regulation of the Act of Clearing XL of 
2014.  
Opportunity to 
opt-out 
12§ of the Act names the opportunity for the consumer to initiate 
the avoidance of changing in the FX contract only IF the consumer 
proves that he/she has incomes in the foreign currency of the FX 
loan 15 times more than the official minimum wage of Hungary, 
and the loans duration ends before 31st December 2020, and 
declaring to understand that the preferential rules will not be 
applicable any more for the contract.  
 
As according to 21 § of the Act, preferential exchange rates came into effect on 1st 
January 2015 and households felt its positive effects almost immediately. On 15th 
January 2015, Switzerland's central bank declared discontinuing its currency "ceiling" of 
CHF 1.2 per EUR, introduced in the middle of the eurozone crisis and has significantly 
lowered interest rates, reducing the deposit rate to -0.75 per cent. Figure 4 shows the 
average exchange rates of CHF/HUF between 2007 and 2014. As a comparison, Figure 
5 shows the exchange rates in January 2015.  
 
Figure 4. Source: MNB  Figure 5. Exchange rates of HUF/CHF 
in January, 2015. Source: MNB  
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Experts at the MNB calculated that with the gate of exchange rates enforced by the Act 
LXXVII of 2014, Hungarian households saved 700 billion HUF of loan-growth just 
because of 15th January’s event, which saving is equal to 2% of the Hungarian GDP.12 
Significant change in jurisdiction on the subject of FX loans 
A definitely new era has come in the Hungarian jurisdiction after judgement C-26/13 
of the European Court of Justice.  On 16th December 2013, the Hungarian Supreme 
Court made a decision of legal unity on FX loans declaring that FX loan agreements are 
not unfair on the basis that they locate the risk of exchange-rates' change merely on 
consumers/borrowers. These contracts are not barge into morality, are not usurer, are 
not tending to impossible service and are not pretended ones. The fact that the balance 
of services has changed (even dramatically, but not foreseeable) during the run, cannot 
be taken as a purpose of invalidity, as the cause of invalidity must occur in the time of 
contracting. Although, the decision of the Supreme Court declares that financial 
institutions should argumentatively prove that they informed borrowers about risks and 
the possibility of change in the exchange rates and its effects on installments.  
After three years of court battles and under the pressure of more than ten thousand 
individual claims, the Hungarian Supreme Court issued a general statement in June 
(2/2014 Civil Law Cases) which admits that FX mortgage agreements are affected by a 
number of irregularities. Many of these irregularities would make FX mortgages void. 
The Supreme Court, however, is reluctant to apply this legal consequence, it claims that 
it would not be fair to consumers if courts would declare the FX mortgage agreements 
void because consumers would be obliged to repay the mortgage at once and this 
would exceed their financial capabilities. Judges of the Supreme Court openly called on 
the parliament to adopt a new law in order to restore the validity of FX mortgage 
agreements and stop consumers filing new claims against banks. Judges say that the 
high number of consumer claims is obstructing the work of the judiciary.  
The Supreme Court also made decisions on the question of currency spread. In 
addition to the usual costs of a loan, foreign currency mortgage loans also involve  
costs of currency conversion. Costs relating to the currency conversion arise due to the 
difference between the bid and ask price for the foreign currency, known as exchange 
rate spread. The exchange rate spread is incurred in monthly repayment rates and is set 
according to the bank’s own exchange rates ranging between 1% and 5% of the 
monthly instalments, or several thousand euros per loan agreement in actual terms. 
According to the EU Consumer Credit Directive as adopted into Hungarian law, loan 
contracts with consumers must state all costs of loan. Legal consequence if costs are 
not disclosed is, under Hungarian law, that such contracts are invalid. Between 2000 
and 2010, most Hungarian banks failed to state the costs incurred by the exchange rate 
spread in foreign currency loan contracts. 
Connecting to the legislative procedure against financial institutions, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court made its position clear in 2014 declaring the following “ (…) the 
 
12 MNB press release. See: http://www.mnb.hu/sajtoszoba/sajtokozlemenyek/2015-evi-
sajtokozlemenyek/a-lakossagi-deviza-alapu-jelzaloghitelesek-torlesztoreszlete-mar-nem-emelkedhet 
(08.09.2015) 
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legislature – as well as the court – is entitled to amend existing long-term [private law] 
agreements if the agreement becomes inapplicable because of a fundamental change in 
circumstances has occurred after the conclusion of the agreement and adhering to the 
agreement would violate the substantial legal interest of any party, moreover, if the 
change in circumstances was not reasonably foreseeable and it goes beyond the 
ordinary risk of such change. An additional condition for intervention by an act of 
legislation is that the fundamental change in circumstances must affect the entire 
society, which means that a large number of agreements must be affected. Parliament 
has the sole discretion and at the same time obligation to assess when the entire society 
is affected and, therefore, when an intervention by an act of legislation is required”.13  
Concluding remarks 
After the crisis on the Hungarian financial market started in late 2008, the formal 
regulation of consumer lending was not sustainable. As almost one-third of the nation 
was affected by FX-loans, basically in Swiss Franc, the main goal of the government 
was to save their voters – even with sacrificing the banking sector of Hungary, which 
already faced its darkest days in these years. Hungary had classical liberal democrat 
governance until 2010 but a turning point can be seen in April 2010: namely, right-sided 
but in actions socialist and nationalist government has been formed (and re-voted in 
2014), facing with the challenge of multitudinous FX-based mortgage loans (with a 
growing ratio of non-performing ones). The government decided to end up the age of 
FX loans with relatively hard tools: as a summary we can say that almost all possible 
risks of FX loans has been turned from the borrowers to the lenders and the price 
between Hungarian Forint and FX loans has been (or is these days) forced to be paid 
by the banking sector. As a result of the efforts made by the government, the 
household debt growth stopped and most FX based loans were eliminated – as can be 
seen in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 8/2014. Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, point 90. Amended on 20th March, 2014. 
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Figure 6.: Net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of households by main products 
and currencies, adjusted for exchange rate changes. Source: MNB 
 
 
 
 
Although it seems that the government’s activity is a fairy tale so far, a very important 
question needs to be answered in the upcoming years: now, that Hungarian households 
are a bit “stressed away” from loans, how would it affect the inner demand? While the 
government successfully turned out FX loans and at the same time a strike a blew on 
the financial sector, with the cutback of personal income taxes hoped to increase the 
domestic consumption. However, as can be seen on Figure 7, it has not yet been so 
successful.  
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Figure 7: Use of household income as a ratio of disposable income. Source: MNB 
(Note: Disposable income is estimated by the MNB using household consumption, 
investment and financial savings data.) 
 
 
 
Figure 7 also shows a sharp increase in net financial savings. Sadly, the year of 2015 was 
also eventful in the financial intermediary sector: during the year 2 great broker and 
investor companies became under liquidation and the negative effects of these will be 
seen only in the Q4 of 2015. This also has effect on the Hungarian financial market as a 
whole: the government’s communication is against financial companies since the crisis, 
and now it seen they were right.  
The question of the future is how and when will households turn back to the 
financial sector both in the field of lending and on the field of savings. 
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